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Abstract 
 
Employment of software agents for conducting negotia-
tions with online customers promises to increase the flexi-
bility and reach of the exchange mechanism and reduce 
transaction costs. Past research had suggested different 
negotiation tactics for the agents, and had used them in ex-
perimental settings against human negotiators. This work 
explores the interaction between negotiation strategies and 
the complexity of the negotiation task as represented by the 
number of negotiation issues. Including more issues in a 
negotiation potentially allows the parties more space to 
maneuver and, thus, promises higher likelihood of agree-
ment. In practice, the consideration of more is-sues re-
quires higher cognitive effort, which could have a negative 
effect on reaching an agreement. The results of human–
agent negotiation experiments conducted at a major Cana-
dian university revealed that there is an interaction be-
tween chosen strategy and task complexity. Also, when 
competitive strategy was employed, the agents' utility was 
the highest. Because competitive strategy resulted in fewer 
agreements the average utility per agent was the highest in 
the compromising–competitive strategy. 
  
Keywords: human-agent negotiations, software agents, 
strategies, concessions, multi-attribute utility, experiments, 
task complexity 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Negotiations can be conducted online by using e-negotia-
tion systems. E-negotiation systems can facilitate the com-
munication of participating parties and offer a variety of 
decision aids [1]. These systems can flexibly organize ne-
gotiations in certain relational structures and sequential 
processes of exchange. They can impose the format of the 
exchanged offers and provide analytical support for nego-
tiators in different phases. These features make e-negotia-
tion systems different from general communication tools, 
such as e-mail and Internet messengers. Typically, these 
systems provide support to their users by helping them cap-
ture and model their objectives, preferences, reservation 
levels, and other important aspects. While the system fea-
tures can smooth negotiation processes and reduce negoti-
ators’ efforts, the negotiators are still responsible for the 
negotiation outcomes, as they need to engage in repetitive 
decision-making, interact with other negotiators, assess in-
coming offers, and construct counter-offers.  
Autonomous software agents become increasingly pop-
ular in e-commerce. They participate in a variety of com-
mercial activities [2] [3]. Designing and offering software 
agents that are capable of conducting negotiations has been 
a persistent interest of the software-agent research commu-
nity [4]. When software agents are employed to conduct 
commerce negotiations, technology takes an active role of 
determining social affairs.  
A distinguishing feature of negotiation is that negotia-
tors need to resolve mutual dependencies. Negotiation 
agreements depend on the other negotiators’ choices. Thus, 
conducting fully automated negotiations for business trans-
actions is tricky, as the resulting commitment when an 
agreement is achieved may not be desirable to the principal 
businesses or individuals.  
On the other hand, employment of agents in negotiations 
can be beneficial due to the fact that software agents have 
computational advantages as compared to human negotia-
tors. Software agents can operate faster and potentially op-
timize the outcome given the information available to 
them. They do not get distracted, which is very different 
from humans whose decisions are influenced by their se-
lective attention. In addition, agent behavior is less biased 
and more consistent than that of humans [5]. When an 
agent receives a negotiation task specified in terms of ne-
gotiation issues, preferences, reservation levels, and the 
concession-making strategies, it will negotiate precisely in 
accordance with these specifications.  
Employing software agents to negotiate with others can 
have additional benefits. For instance, agents can reduce 
negotiation-related efforts, help people with limited nego-
tiation skills [6], save time with lower opportunity costs, 
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alleviate negative effects, and achieve more efficient set-
tlements [7]. The design of software agents that are capable 
of negotiating has been focusing primarily on engineering 
aspects. Empirical studies of how agents perform when ne-
gotiating with human negotiators remain rare.  
This work investigates the performance of agent-to-hu-
man negotiations when tactics adopted by agents and task 
complexity vary. The work attempts to explore the pro-
spects of employing software agents to conduct real busi-
ness transactions. An experiment was conducted by manip-
ulating agent negotiation style and negotiation-task com-
plexity.  
An electronic negotiation system, which enables the cre-
ation of negotiation cases, setting up multiple negotiation 
issues and preference structures, defining negotiation tac-
tics for agents, as well as other functions was built for the 
experiment. Software agents and human negotiators were 
paired in negotiation dyads, which then negotiated on an 
either simple or complex business case. The results reveal 
that agent-negotiation tactics and task complexity have an 
interaction effect. Specifically, agents that used a competi-
tive tactic reached more agreements in the simple case than 
in the complex case. A similar effect was absent when 
agents adopt a compromising tactic. 
The paper builds on and extends the work presented in 
[8]. It has five more sections. Prior work on the design of 
and experiments with software agents is discussed in Sec-
tion 2. Negotiation strategies are introduced in Section 2. 
Concessions are one of the key component of strategy. The 
design of the concession schedules that agents can employ 
is also discussed in this section. The agent-human negotia-
tion experiment is discussed in Section 4 and it is followed 
by the presentation of the experiment results. Conclusions 
and future work complete the paper. 
 
2. Background 
 
One of the first experiments involving agent negotiations 
involved Kasbah marketplace [9, 10]. In these experiments 
users created simple agents that were dispatched to meet 
and negotiate with each other on price only for items. The 
agents incorporated three types of negotiation concession 
tactics. These tactics are used to decide what kind of offer 
to make at a given point in the negotiation process. 
Faratin, Sierra and Jennings [11], in an influential study 
that build on the Kasbah experiments, proposed formal rep-
resentation of the agent negotiation strategies of which 
concession tactics were a key component. The choice of 
concession tactic based on the negotiation history and con-
text, deadline and other variables. This allowed the agent 
to employ different tactics within a single strategy.  
Three categories of tactics have been identified: behav-
ior-dependent, time-dependent, and resource-dependent. 
The behavior-dependent tactics make their choice of offer 
based on the moves made by the parties. An example in-
cludes tit-for-tat tactics that advocate that the concession to 
be made by a party should be proportional, or symmetrical 
to the one made by the counterpart.  
The second family of tactics model concession-making 
as a function of time elapsed between the beginning of ne-
gotiation and the estimated ending point. Curves showing 
small concessions in the beginning corresponded to 
tougher competitive behavior, while those making large 
concessions and quickly approaching the vicinity of reser-
vation levels related to compromising behavior. Resource-
dependent tactics adjusted concession levels based on the 
scarcity of the resources involved.   
Regarding agent involvement in electronic negotiations, 
three categories can be mentioned: (1) human-to-human 
negotiations with agent support; (2) agent-to-agent negoti-
ations featuring full automation on both sides of a table, 
and (3) human-to-agent negotiations, where a software 
agent is paired up with a human counterpart [7].  
The first category includes use of agents as advisors for 
helping human negotiators cope with the complexity of ne-
gotiations involving multiple issues, and staying in line 
with their defined preference structures and concession-
making plans. Work on Aspire agents [12] and eAgora 
marketplaces [13] are examples of the first category work. 
For instance, experiments with agent-supported negotia-
tions revealed that human negotiators using agents as advi-
sors performed better in complex (multi-issues) tasks than 
unassisted human negotiators  [14].  
Work in the second category, i.e., agent-to-agent nego-
tiations, has been extensive and includes distributed AI, 
multi-agent systems and learning [see, e.g., 4, 15-18]. The 
current work falls into the third category in which both hu-
man and agents negotiated.  
Early studies on human-agent negotiations deals with 
providing the agents with negotiation capabilities [19, 20]. 
Klein, Woods, et al. [21] discuss ten challenges for making 
software agents capable of participating in joint human-
agent activities.  
Major challenges of designing agents that can negotiated 
with humans include bounded rationality and incomplete 
information. Yang and Singhal [6] formulated guidelines 
for agent-designers have been proposed: randomization (to 
prevent manipulation of an agent by an opponent), having 
a concession strategy, and maintaining a database of past 
interactions (for modeling the opponents).  
Chavez et al. [7] suggested several tactics that agents 
could employ in negotiations with humans. The suggested 
tactics were: making a tough initial offer; making two or 
more simultaneous equivalent (to an agent) offers; making 
monotonously decreasing concessions (as suggested by 
Raiffa [22] to signal “approaching the limit”); making large 
concessions in the final offer; and using strategic delays.  
Few experimental studies involving humans and agents 
in exchange settings focusing on objective as well as sub-
jective aspects of negotiations have been reported. An early 
experimental study matching humans with agent counter-
parts involved AutONA agents [23]. The agents negotiated 
on price and volume while following the so-called alpha-
beta tactics. The agents did not significantly outperform 
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humans.  
An agent representing a salesperson that employed per-
suasion and negotiation techniques while interacting with 
a customer is described in [24]. Persuasion involved cus-
tomer – agent dialogue with the use of pre-defined argu-
ments organized into a tree. Price was the single negotiated 
issue. The findings suggested that persuasion increased 
buyers’ product valuation and willingness to pay, and ne-
gotiation increased the seller’s surplus.  
De Melo, Celso and Gratch [25] examined effects of 
agents’ expression of emotions on the negotiator’s conces-
sion behavior. In this study, human subjects were paired up 
with agents that expressed anger, neutrality, or happiness 
during negotiations. For that purpose, the agents used both 
with verbal and non-verbal expression mode. The subjects 
were aware that they were negotiating with machines. As 
expected, “angry” agents were able to gain more conces-
sions from the human opponents than the “happy” ones.  
In [26], the authors investigated effects of using various 
agent negotiation tactics in experiments with human sub-
jects. In these bilateral negotiation experiments involving 
the sale of a computer five different concession-making 
styles were used: competitive, linear, compromising, com-
petitive-then-compromising, and tit-for-tat. Agents were 
on the seller side, while humans were on the buyer side. A 
control group was included on the seller side, including hu-
man subjects. The results revealed that most agent types 
outperformed human “colleagues” in terms of utility of the 
achieved agreement and the agreement rate. Competitive 
agents achieved the highest utility levels, while compro-
mising agents had the highest number of agreements.  
Vahidov, Kersten and Gimon [27], agents were em-
ployed in multi-bilateral negotiation settings. Here, the 
case featured a procurement scenario with a single buyer 
and three sellers. The buyer would award a single contract 
to one of the sellers based on simultaneous negotiations 
with all three counterparts. While most of the participants 
were human subjects, agents were present in some of the 
seller groups. The results showed that compromising 
agents achieved higher agreement rates than humans, while 
competitive ones failed to win any contract.  
 
3. Negotiations strategies, tactics, and tasks 
 
In the current work, we set out to investigate the perfor-
mance of agents not only based on the agent strategies, but 
also on the complexity of the negotiation task. The com-
plexity is manipulated by varying the number of issues in-
volved in the negotiation process.  
 
3.1 Negotiation strategies and tactics 
 
Scholars in negotiations as well as military and political 
sciences distinguish between strategies and tactics [28]. 
Strategies are relatively stable and are associated with the 
negotiator’s attitude to conflict situations, negotiation con-
text, skills and the importance of the conflict and its reso-
lution, Negotiator’s skills include the toolbox of methods 
for conflict assessment and its resolution. A tactic is the 
combination of concrete methods that are selected at any 
specific time of the negotiation process; they are context- 
and time-dependent [29].  
In some situations, participants may employ a single tac-
tic which is equivalent to a strategy. This is the case with 
software agents that employ a concession formula irrespec-
tively of the changes in the negotiation context. When the 
agents use context-dependent messages, alter their conces-
sion patterns, or change their frequency of offers and/or 
messages, then they are likely to employ different tactics 
within a single strategy.  
There are five well-known types of approaches to con-
flict [18], [30], three of which can be used to define nego-
tiation strategies’ types, i.e., competitive, compromising 
and collaborating. Collaborating strategies require that the 
negotiators make an effort in exchanging truthful infor-
mation, including their preferences and trade-offs. This ef-
fort as well as the negotiators’ unwillingness to provide 
their counterparts with truthful relevant information [31, 
32] led us to focus on competitive and compromising strat-
egies.  
In addition to the two pure strategies we have also im-
plemented two mixed strategies. The mixed strategies de-
scribe situations in which the negotiators at some point 
switch from their competitive (compromising) tactics and 
employ compromising (competitive) tactics.  
 
3.2 Task complexity 
 
Task complexity broadly refers to the effort required to 
perform the task [33] and it can be assessed based on three 
aspects: (1) syntactic difficulty; (2) cognitive complexity; 
and (3) communicative stress [34]. We are concerned here 
with the cognitive complexity measured against the num-
ber of the negotiation issues. A meta-analysis of the task-
performance relationship shows that increased complexity 
is negatively correlated with performance [35].  
Increased complexity causes the negotiators to consider 
only a small subset of offers, which is likely to lead to poor 
agreements [36]. It also significantly contributes to a more 
frequent use of competitive tactics over compromising and 
collaborative tactics [37].  
High cognitive task complexity, e.g., having a large 
number of issues that are preferentially interdependent, re-
quires that the negotiators extend more effort and focus on 
the task. This may lead to a decrease of effort on the pro-
cess and its progress. One approach to reduce complexity 
is to engage in issue-by-issue negotiations which is cogni-
tively simpler but prone to abuse by the counterpart and 
may lead to inferior agreements [38, 39].  
Decision and negotiation aids, including tools used for 
preference elicitation and utility function construction, 
help the negotiators to engage in negotiations, where they 
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simultaneously consider multiple issues. This is the case in 
our experiments: both the agents and the human partici-
pants exchange offers that comprise values for all issues.  
The focus here is on the agents’ performance and the 
quality of the agreements they achieve. Following earlier 
studies, we analyze the relationship between the task com-
plexity and the agreement quality (measured with utility). 
In addition, we compare the efficacy of negotiation strate-
gies for different tasks. 
 
4. Negotiation experiment 
 
Two negotiation cases used in the experiments and the 
agents’ concession schedules are discussed below. 
 
4.1 Negotiation case 
 
Two types of cases were included:  
1. Simple cases involved the following five issues: price, 
regular air time, extra air time, text messaging, and 
data. The buyers and sellers were given both different 
and divergent preferences (weights) for these issues, 
indicating their importance levels.  
2. Complex cases involved ten issues: in addition to the 
five issues of the simple case also call display, 
voicemail, call waiting, conference call, and call for-
warding. 
Figure 1 shows the screenshot for the setup of a simple 
case. The setup for the complex case was similar. 
 
 
Figure 1. Setup of the simple case 
 
In order to calculate the total utility of the offer, the is-
sues and the issue options were assigned weights. These 
weights were used in an additive utility function to estimate 
the level of attractiveness of an offer. Agents used this in-
formation in order to decide on the acceptability of the re-
ceived offers and to generate offers. 
 
4.2 Strategies and concessions  
 
We have chosen four strategies for the agents: competitive, 
compromising, competitive-then-compromising, and com-
promising-then-competitive.  
Each strategy was defined by two components: (1) a 
strategy configuration component; and (2) a concession 
curve component.  
The screen used for strategy configuration for the agent 
is shown in Figure 2 and the concession curves are shown 
in Figures 3 and 4.  
 
 
Figure 2. Strategy configuration 
 
Strategy configuration included the following three 
components: (1) the specification of the timing of the first 
and subsequent offers; (2) the way the agent considered the 
human negotiator’s offers in the computation of the coun-
teroffer offers; and (3) the messages that the agent sent 
(with or without offers) when the message condition was 
met. 
With each strategy, a time-dependent concession func-
tion was associated, they jointly represent the complete 
strategy. The concession curve was modeled using Bezier 
curves. The concession schedule associated with pure strat-
egy was modeled with: 
B(t) = (1−t)2 P0 + 2(1−t) t P1 + t2 P2; 
and the concession schedule associated with mixed strat-
egy was modeled with 
B(t) = (1−t)3 P0 + 3(1−t)2 t P1 + 3(1−t) t2 P2 + t3 P3: 
where t ∈ [0, 1], P1, P2, P3 and P4 are points used to define 
the max, min and curvature of the curve (indicated as dots 
in Figs. 3 and 4). 
Competitive agents tend to make smaller concessions in 
terms of the utility of generated offers in the beginning of 
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the negotiations. However, as they approach the negotia-
tion deadline, they begin making larger concessions in 
search of an agreement. These agents are expected to have 
the highest utility of agreement levels, perhaps at the ex-
pense of the number of agreements.  
Compromising agents tend to make large concessions in 
the very beginning of the negotiation period in an attempt 
to reach agreement quickly. This represents the case where 
an agent is anxious to sell the plan. Compromising agents 
are not expected to have high utility value deals, although 
they are more likely to make an agreement. 
Concessions schedules for the two pure strategies are 
shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Competitive and compromising  
schedules 
 
The two remaining strategies comprise a mix of the 
competitive and compromising schedules. Part of the 
guidelines for agent tactics design were outlined in [7], as 
mentioned in the background section suggested: making a 
tough initial offer; making monotonously decreasing con-
cessions; making large concession in the final offer. 
The compromising-competitive schedule mimics this 
sort of behavior. It starts with the tough offer, then makes 
quick concessions. These become smaller with time to 
make an opponent think that the agent is reaching its reser-
vation level. If the counterpart does not propose a good of-
fer for the agent, then the agent makes another small con-
cession in an effort to reach an agreement.  
The competitive-compromising strategy starts out tough 
in the hopes of grabbing high-value deals. However, if an 
agreement is not reached in the initial phases, the agent 
switches to compromising mode. In this way, the agent 
could combine the benefits of both competitive and com-
peting tactics.  
Concession schedules for the two mixed strategies are 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
4.3 Human participants 
 
The subjects were recruited from university students en-
rolled in an online case. The case was chosen so that the 
subjects had a good level of familiarity with it. The case 
featured the sale of a mobile phone plan.  
Prior to the negotiation, the case was outlined to the sub-
jects, who could ask questions and request clarifications. 
We found out that most subjects were well aware of the 
issues involved in such plans and only a few required ad-
ditional explanations.  
 
 
Figure 4. Compromising-then-competitive and 
competitive-then-compromising schedules 
 
4.4 Experiment 
 
The treatments included randomly pairing up the subjects 
with various types of agents in a simple or complex case as 
described above. The experiment was conducted on the 
web, whereby subjects could perform their tasks from any 
location in an asynchronous mode during a two-day period. 
The subjects were invited to join the negotiations via 
emails containing the link to the system. Human subjects 
were free to terminate the negotiation at any time without 
reaching an agreement.  
All agents acted on the seller side and they were not 
aware of the buyers’ preferences. The buyers’ and the 
sellers’ preference weights were somewhat different in or-
der to promote tradeoffs, which have been considered one 
of the key activities necessary to reach an efficient agree-
ment.  
The preferences were specified and fixed for all human 
users. This was done in order to control variation in the ex-
periments.  
 
5. Results 
 
A total of 754 subjects have participated in the experiment 
416
and have completed the experimental task. For the analysis 
of the results we have selected only those subjects who 
made more than one offer to filter out the cases where sub-
jects did not take the experimental case seriously. After fil-
tering the number of subjects dropped to 368. Based on 
these retained observations, 262 negotiations (71%) ended 
up in an agreement, while 106 (29%) dyads did not make 
an agreement.  
 
5.1 Agreement rate 
 
The agreement rate for the simple case setting was 75.5%, 
while for the complex case it was 65.4%. Thus, in simple 
case, including fewer issues, the agreements were more fre-
quent. On one hand, a larger number of issues should give 
negotiators more space for “maneuvering” in negotiations, 
thus higher likelihood of making an agreement. On the 
other hand, the complexity of the case taxes cognitive ca-
pabilities of the humans and requires more cognitive effort.  
In our setup, one case included five issues, while the 
other featured ten. This seems to be the reason why fewer 
agreements were made in the complex case. Table 1 dis-
plays the agreement rates for the four tactics overall, and 
for simple vs. complex cases separately.   
 
Table 1. Agreement rates for different  
agent types 
Strategy Simple case Complex case Overall 
Competitive 57.1% 48.9% 53.6% 
Compromising 87.7% 85.3% 87.0% 
Compromising 
– Competitive 83.8% 70.0% 75.9% 
Competitive –
Compromising 71.0% 60.0% 66.1% 
  
As one can see from the table, the highest agreement 
rates were achieved by the compromising agents, and the 
lowest one by the competitive agents. This is not surprising 
given their concession schedules the other two agent types 
are in between the extremes. However, compromising-
competitive agents seem to have been able to make more 
agreements than the competitive-compromising ones. 
Thus, apparently the guidelines for agent design seem to be 
having a positive impact in terms of the likelihood of an 
agreement.  
Case complexity does not seem to have a large effect on 
the agreement rate for the compromising agents. This 
makes sense, as the agent concedes so quickly that agree-
ments are reached early regardless the complexity of the 
case. It does seem to have a larger impact when an agent is 
competitive. The implication here is that competitive 
agents are more likely to make an agreement in simpler 
cases. Interestingly, the biggest difference in terms of 
agreement rate is for the compromising-competitive 
agents. For simple cases their agreement rate approaches 
the rates for the compromising agent.  
 
5.2 Sellers’ strategy and agreement utility 
 
Next, we analyze the agent performance in terms of the 
seller utility of the achieved agreements. For this analysis 
only the instances where the agreement was achieved were 
included to enable calculation of the utilities. A general lin-
ear model was built incorporating agent types and the com-
plexity level for predicting the obtained utilities. Number 
of offers was included as a co-variate as it represented ef-
fort and time spent in the negotiation instances.  
Multivariate tests showed that the case complexity, 
agent type, and number of offers were all significant at p = 
0.05 level. Furthermore, the interaction of case complexity 
and agent type was also significant. Table 2 shows the re-
sults of utility calculations for different agent types.   
 
Table 2. Sellers’ average agreement utility  
for different concession schedules  
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall 
Competitive 81.42 61.55 73.67 
Compromising 47.05 45.96 46.74 
Compromising 
– Competitive 54.16 49.86 51.88 
Competitive –
Compromising 53.26 46.33 50.45 
Average 57.02 50.87 54.62 
 
 The sellers achieved higher final utility in the simple 
case setting than in the complex case setting (61.5 and 52.4 
respectively).  
Overall, competitive agents achieved agreements with 
the highest utility, followed by the compromising-compet-
itive, competitive-compromising, and lastly, compromis-
ing agents. Complexity of the case has the largest impact 
for competitive agents, medium impact for the compromis-
ing-competitive and competitive-compromising agents, 
and virtually no impact for the compromising agents. 
 
5.3 Sellers’ utility 
 
The competitive strategy may produce the highest agree-
ment’s utility for individual agents but the agreements are 
achieved in the smallest number of the negotiations; 57.1% 
of the competitive agents achieved an agreement in the 
simple case and 48.9% in the complex case (see Table 1). 
From the perspective of a business that employs selling 
agents the average utility per seller is more important cri-
terion because it determines the total utility (profit). Table 
3 shows the average utility of an agreement per one seller.  
For the simple case, the average utility per one seller is 
the highest for the competitive strategy followed by com-
promising–competitive strategy. For the complex case, in-
terestingly, agents that employ the compromising strategy 
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achieve the highest utility value, followed by agents em-
ploying the compromising–competitive strategy.  
 
Table 3. Average utility per seller 
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall 
Competitive 46.52 30.12 39.52 
Compromising 41.24 39.20 40.60 
Compromising 
– Competitive 45.38 34.90 39.36 
Competitive – 
Compromising 37.80 27.80 33.34 
Average 42.73 33.01 38.21 
 
Based on these results, we can say that a business that 
does not distinguish between simple and complex negotia-
tion cases should employ equipped selling agents with the 
compromising strategy because on average it produces 
higher utility than the agents that use competitive strategy. 
The latter is very closely followed by compromising–com-
petitive strategy that produces results. Overall, these three 
strategies yielded much higher utility, compared to the 
competitive-compromising strategy. 
 
5.4 Buyers’ utility 
 
This work focuses on the agent performance in two differ-
ent settings and the implication of their use of different ne-
gotiation strategies on the agreement’s utility. In the case 
of single-shot negotiations and when reputation has no im-
pact on the negotiators’ behavior one-sided focus may be 
sufficient. If, however sellers engage in repeated negotia-
tions and/or reputation plays a role, then the results 
achieved by the other-side are likely to play a role [40, 41]. 
Therefore, we briefly discuss here the results achieved by 
the buyers. Table 4 shows the average buyers’ utility for 
the agreements; this table corresponds to Table 2 for the 
sellers. 
 
Table 4. Buyers’ average agreement utility  
for agent’s different concession schedules 
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall 
Competitive 8.57 18.70 12.52 
Compromising 37.29 39.96 38.06 
Compromising 
– Competitive 30.39 19.01 24.35 
Competitive - 
Compromising 18.91 30.81 23.73 
Average 26.96 26.63 26.83 
 
Table 4 shows that the buyers achieved significantly 
lower utility values (all utility values were between 0 and 
100). Particularly the difference for the competitive strate-
gies is drastic: the sellers achieved 81.42 and 61.55 while 
the buyers achieved 8.57 and 18.7 for the simple and com-
plex cases, respectively. The competitive-compromising 
strategy produced somewhat better results for the buyers 
but the difference is quite large. In both case types and for 
every strategy the sellers outperformed the buyers. 
The buyers’ low utility of the agreements results in poor 
results achieved by every buyer on average. The buyers’ 
utilities shown in Table 5 correspond to the sellers’ utilities 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 5. Average utility per buyer for  
agents’ different concession schedules 
Concession Simple case Complex case Overall 
Competitive 4.90 9.15 6.72 
Compromising 32.69 34.09 33.10 
Compromising 
– Competitive 25.46 13.31 18.48 
Competitive - 
Compromising 13.42 18.48 15.68 
Average 20.35 17.41 19.10 
 
From the results shown in Table 3 it follows that a com-
pany that would employ all the buyers participating in this 
experiment would obtain utility per buyer of 20.35 for the 
simple case and 17.41 for the complex case. This can be 
contrasted with a selling company that employed all the 
agents: it would achieve utility 43.03 for the simple case 
and 33.26 for the complex case. This means that the agents 
achieved over twice as much as the human buyers. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this work was to investigate the effects of 
agent negotiation strategies and negotiation task complex-
ity on agent performance in electronic negotiations. As sus-
pected, the agents’ negotiation strategies have a significant 
interaction with the task complexity. This difference is es-
pecially prominent for the competitive agents, as they 
made significantly fewer agreements and achieved signifi-
cantly lower agreement utilities in complex cases. Overall, 
agents made 18% more agreements in negotiations involv-
ing fewer issues.  
One limitation of the current research is that experiment 
was done online rather than in the lab setting. This reduced 
the potential control over the subject behavior in the exper-
iments. Furthermore, the time span allocated for the exper-
iment (two days) may have affected the results achieved by 
the human buyers. Future in-lab experiments preceded with 
a quiz that assess the participants’ understanding of the 
case and the task should be undertaken to overcome these 
limitations. We also plan to varying levels of complexity, 
for example, by including a single issue, three issues, five 
issues, and ten issues.  
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Another limitation is that we consider one-shot negotia-
tions. When the transactions between sellers and buyer re-
peat over time, then the sellers may employ strategies that 
are likely to create a relationship with the buyers so that 
they are more likely to engage in future negotiations. In sit-
uations when repeat sales are unlikely, this limitation may 
be of lesser importance.  
A related limitation is due to the lack of competition. 
The buyers could not terminate their negotiations with one 
seller and initiate change with another seller. One exten-
sion may be an experiment in which the buyers have more 
flexibility and may negotiate with several sellers sequen-
tially or simultaneously. A more complex experiment is an 
online market situation that is similar to a stock exchange 
and in which one seller may negotiate with multiple buyers 
and one buyer – with multiple sellers.  
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